Being a review of the Lake Chad Basin Development (LCBDC) & The Nile River Basin (NRB) Countries by Olusegun Ehinfun, (MBA, PhD. Candidate), and Paul R. Sachs, (PhD, MBA) delivered at Development Studies Association (DSA) Conference, University of Reading, June 28 – 30, 2023 and Global Corporate Governance Institute (GCGI) 9th International Conference on CSR, Sustainability, Ethics & Governance, June 14 -16 2023. Santander, Spain. 

Summary: 

Balancing national interest, regional collaboration and economic sustainability will be even more important in a world where climate change affects the distribution of key resources such as water. Leaders must be proactive in managing this balance to address both planned and unplanned changes. 

Abstract 

The perennial flooding that impacts countries and communities within the Lake Chad Basin Development Areas (LCBDC) has increased in recent years due to climate change. Its negative impact on the communities is further accentuated by the absence of multinational and cross regional cooperation, specifically the flood management strategies between the governments of Nigeria and Cameroon.  As a result, the affected communities have seen an increase in divisiveness, despair and reduced economic sustainability.  Furthermore, these factors foster the growth of extreme and violent fringe groups. 

Likewise the disputes and political tension between Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt over the waters of the River Nile, have intensified since 2011. In July 2022, after Ethiopia commenced the third-stage filling operations of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), Egypt and Sudan bristled over the stalled tripartite negotiations. While each country is entitled to take actions to support its citizenry, if the broader region is destabilized such support will not be sustainable. 

Balancing national initiatives with a socio-economic perspective in large, trans-national regions will be increasingly important due to climate change. Cross-regional cooperation, with fundamentally similar development aspirations and approaches, can lead to better outcomes for local communities, for nation-states and geopolitical regions. It can be argued that improved outcomes also support more stable political institutions which further help the populace.

Using these examples as context, the paper will present key factors for leaders to consider when confronting regional environmental decisions - either planned or unplanned. 

Introduction 

Managing natural resources has always been a fundamental responsibility of governance. Nation states and business enterprises must know what their resources are, how to access these resources, assure the distribution of resources to meet the needs of the populace or customers, and monitor the usage of resources. 

Some natural resources, such as minerals, are not subject to change in distribution across the world, or across a given nation state. Others, water in particular, are affected by climate. Climate can alter the distribution of water and its ease of access across man-made national boundaries. Therefore, water resources can have a significant impact on the functioning of a given country or business enterprise. 

It is increasingly accepted that the world is amidst a man-made climate change period. Even if one takes the position of climate change skeptics that such changes are over-stated, management of natural resources remains a fundamental activity of governance.  Moreover, in the case of water resources, the fact that these resources are not stationary and are affected by changes in climate, whether naturally occurring or man-made, means that water management presents unique governance challenges, in particular water resource management requires collaboration across a watershed area, rather than a national boundary. The watershed area may encompass areas in several nation states. 

Challenges of Multinational Cooperation and how they handle transboundary issues: 

The fact that water resources often do not nicely fit into national boundaries creates a challenge for multinational cooperation to manage the resources. As each nation state has a unique history and culture, each view of the resource and how to manage it may differ. Developing a collaborative strategy for managing a water resource requires recognizing the interconnections between nation, negotiation and compromise. 

Clarke-Santher et.al (2017) refer to a shift¹ in the ‘geopolitics of the anthropocene’ (Dalby, 2007).² Crutzen (2002) conceptualized that we live in an era in which the ‘global environmental system’ is not only dominated but also impacted by humans.³ This notion is also espoused by Lorimer’s belief and conceptualisation that the ‘Anthropocene is an epistemological divergence; nature can no longer be viewed as separate from humanity.”⁴ 

However, the way and manner various global water crises unfold in the Anthropocene is clearly encapsulated in the example of the perennial flooding that impacts the Lake Chad Basin Development Countries (LCBDC). The impact can be put down historically to an absence of multinational and cross disciplinary cooperation over the years between governments in Nigeria and Cameroon. For example, the annual exercise occasioned by the opening of the reservoir from the Lagdo Dam in Cameroon, and the inability of the Nigerian government(s) to complete the Dasin Hausa Dam,⁵ previously agreed upon in bilateral agreements, impacted communities within Cameroon and communities in the bordering central plains in Nigeria - along the banks of the Rivers Niger and Benue. 

The dissonance of policy inertia on this issue is not only underlined by the issue of identity, but rather underlined the divisiveness, angst and despair faced by affected communities. The flooding in 2022, which is explained by climate change due to unseasonal rainfall, is the worst since 2012 according to the National Emergency Management Authority (NEMA).⁶ 

An absence of political will to solve such issues in a sustainable manner is at the root of this challenge. Especially those arising from the absence of follow through on the 1983 Memorandum of Understanding (MOUs) between the governments of Nigeria and Cameroon. This belies the opportunities for national cooperation and cross-regional/international consensus on ameliorating the conditions brought on by climate change. It is not just the Lagdo dam from Cameroon that led to fatal consequences during the flooding in 2002, the precipitation and overflowing of other inland dams (Kainji, Jebba, Shiroro) also contributed to the natural disasters (Omorogbe P., 2022).⁷ Analogous to the disagreement between two riparian nations (Nigeria and Cameroon) of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) are the disputes over the waters of the River Nile, between Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt since 2011. In July 2022, after Ethiopia commenced the third-stage filling operations of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), Egypt and Sudan bristled over the stalled tripartite negotiations. According to an article published by Asharq al-Awsat newspaper July 12, the third stage will likely “raise more tensions with the downstream countries (Egypt and Sudan), despite expectations of limited harm at the current stage in light of high rainfall rates in the upstream countries.” Gamal Bayoumi, Egypt's former assistant minister of foreign affairs, told Al-Monitor, “Egypt is exerting diplomatic pressure by all available means to resume tripartite negotiations on the GERD, preserve its historical rights to the Nile waters and expose Ethiopia's intransigence in refusing a binding agreement on a mechanism for filling and managing the dam.”⁸ 

Arguably, Ethiopia is within its rights to develop its economy by undertaking to build a dam on the tributaries of the Blue Nile River, which are within the country’s borders. Such a project can foster economic development in various sectors of its economy: fisheries, agriculture, electricity generation, flood management and water management. However, the impact of the dam is not limited to the national borders of Ethiopia. Peaceful or collaborative relationships with neighboring nations is a national priority along with the economic development of Ethiopia. Therefore, the larger view of the planning and building of the dam ought to consider the regional implications of it.  

Thus, just as there is a ‘shift in the geopolitics of the Anthropocene’ the building of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) represents a shift in the regional hydro politics and international relations dynamics in the Nile River Basin (NRB) riparian nation-states. This change could present an opportunity for cooperation rather than conflict (Cascão and Nicol, 2016)⁹ Whether conflict or cooperation will depend on how the triumvirate (Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia) governments view the situation. There is a history of cooperation in the NRB. In building a dam on the tributaries of the Blue Nile, Ethiopia is only doing what Egypt did in a similar fashion when it built the Aswan High Dam (AHD). That project, however, was entirely within the boundaries of Egypt. However, the GERD presents an opportunity for cross-regional/international cooperation similar to the Nigeria-Cameroon Lagdo Dam project. 

The best outcomes will be reached when proactive measures and policies are implemented prior to commencement of huge infrastructural and regional public works projects. In 2019 and 2020, in order to head off the potential possibility of conflicts and wars over the construction of the dam, the US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, organised a mediation conference between the foreign ministers of Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan in Washington DC.^{10 & 11} It is incumbent on the International Community, the African Union (AU), the US and Europe to find an amicable and mutually beneficial solution to the crisis, as Ethiopia rejected the final version of the Renaissance Dam Agreement on February 20, 2012.¹²  Already, there have been minor border skirmishes between Sudanese And Ethiopian armed forces in the Al-Fashaqa region in Eastern Sudan - Ethiopia border region. “The quarrel over Al-Fashaqa, which lies within Sudan’s international boundaries but has been settled by Ethiopian farmers for decades, has escalated in recent years alongside a diplomatic spat over Ethiopia’s construction of a hydropower dam.¹³

Balance National interests and Regional Collaboration in Governance

The regional collaboration approach presents a particular challenge to a given nation because its leadership, however the leadership was selected, seeks to represent its national interests.  Water resource management, however, requires regional cooperation. Such cooperation may lead to decisions that compromise national interest and goals for the larger regional benefit (which indirectly does benefit a given national interest). Such a unique leadership challenge requires unique leadership skills, which may not be evident or selected for in the process of a country’s choice of leader. 

In practical terms, various governments have distinct governance systems that could present unique governance challenges either in bilateral, trilateral or multilateral transboundary interactions, engagements and negotiations. One of which is internal domestic politics such as an imperative for industrialization and development, community, societal pressures and influence by internal power brokers or policy entrepreneurs and other epistemic communities; ‘civil society, international donors, private sectors groups’ et. al. (Suhardiman and Giordano, 2012¹⁴; Zawahri and Hensengerth, 2012).¹⁵ This is in addition to the elemental/basic instrumentality (in terms of operationalisation of procedures) of governance. What may present a challenge is the issue of culture, culture change and potential challenges inherent in the cooperation and engagement matrix of nation-states. A viewpoint Constructivists like Naho Mirumachi (2015)¹⁶ propounded Transboundary basin management and riparian politics as being analytical in perspective and  approach especially as applied to riparian states’ engagements, interactions and influence. 

Regarding one of the two examples noted above, Cascão and Nicol, (2016)¹⁷ are of the view that pre-2010 there was a consensus and measure of multilateral cooperation around the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI). The work was geared at attaining a common purpose and vision in the areas of investment, planning, surveys, pooling of resources for beneficial projects and causes for their respective citizenry in a ‘win-win’ scenario that may not compromise on sovereignty. This represents a Liberalism (Internationalist) school of thought (Dryzek and Dunleavy, 2009)¹⁸ that typifies an ideal in riparian international relations. However, it can be argued that Ethiopia has gone the route of the Constructivist approach (Mirumachi Naho, 2015). The constructivist approach is viewed by some scholars, diplomatic and geo-strategic policy watchers as a realist’s conception of the state’s preference and capabilities in transboundary water management. Again, we highlight Cascão and Nicol’s (2016),¹⁹ contention and analysis that the current situation in the GERD (since 2010 onwards) is more of an ‘outcome of change’ and a ‘cause for more change’ from the NBI heydays when: “…Against a background of past hydro political conflict and generalized mistrust between upstream and downstream riparians, the cooperation process was remarkable for its constructiveness and depth of engagement. For example, the NBI developed a detailed portfolio of investment projects with potential to deliver socioeconomic benefits in the fields of energy production and trade, agriculture, watershed management and environmental protection (Nile Basin Initiative, 2014). In the hydro politically complex Eastern Nile Basin, the three riparian states worked together towards the preparation of the ambitious Joint Multipurpose Project (JMP), which included potential development of hydraulic infrastructure in the Blue Nile Basin. This was a huge departure from existing norms, considering that Egypt was initially a full part of this process alongside Sudan and Ethiopia under the Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Program (ENSAP)…” 

Their theoretical analysis of national interests versus regional collaborations is largely based on the conceptions of the: Transboundary Water Interaction school by the London Water Research Group (Zeitoun & Mirumachi, 2008; Zeitoun, Mirumachi, & Warner, 2011; Zeitoun et al., 2014, 2016).¹⁷ In terms of regional collaboration and governance, the example of a proposed cooperation amongst the riparian nation-states of the LCBDC is epitomized in the BIOSPLAT project (Biosphere and Heritage of Lake Chad), promoted under the auspices of UNESCO by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, (Campbell H.G., 2020).²⁰ The transmutation of water, (diverted) from water-surplus areas of rivers, lakes or other bodies of water is beneficial for rivers and lakes regeneration and reclamation. 

The BIOSPLAT proposal presents an opportunity for cooperation within the Sahel and the LCBDC countries. It involves constructing an interbasin water transfer system, channeling water from one of the tributaries of the River Congo and transporting it over a 2,400km via a trans aqua project. It can be argued that one overarching common denominator for agreeing to this multi-year, multi-faceted and complex international project has to do with the national interest. The prospects of harnessing the benefits of the water flow for irrigation, trade, energy generation, watershed husbandry and management holds too much attraction for conflict to arise among the countries of the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) and Equatorial/ Central Africa.

Policy Leadership in Management of Environmental Externalities

What have governments done here that has been positive or effective, and not effective? Governments and nation-states within the LCBDC seem to be more proactive in policy leadership and attempts at engendering joined up thinking in their management of environmental externalities. This behavior stands in contrast to the perceived spotty cooperation which currently exists among the 11 Nile River Basin (NRB) riparian nation-states. Analyzing the structure, efforts and strategies that are effective and their shortcomings.

Oftentimes, what governments and/or nation-states do in transboundary basin management is usually determined by internal dynamics of policy and policy on the domestic plane. However, under Transboundary water management governance conventions individual nation-states are independent actors who order their interactions and relationships with each other under fairly generally agreed rules of operation and terms of references (TORs); (V.Ostrom, 1972;). Polycentrism is one concept of governance some scholars believe has the ability to be efficient and effective as opposed to the existing hierarchical and networked forms of governance (Araral and Hartley, 2013). There are four requirements or conditions for this kind of governance to be workable, not unwieldy and effective according to Vincent Ostrom (1972). These are: Legal community, Constitutional rule, Market conditions, Political conditions. 

These four conditions may not always fit coherently as it would in many a developed country. However, we argue that all the elements of polycentricity central to this discourse are present in the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC). Formed on the 22nd of 1964 by the four countries bordering Lake Chad (RSS Newsletter 2021). Its Executive Secretary is also the Head of Mission of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF):  A joint military multinational armed forces contingent consisting of the militaries of Nigeria, Niger Republic, Chad and Cameroon. This delineates in a clear and concise manner command-and-control responsibilities and accountability. With a rotation of military commanders from each nation-state responsible for the command of the MNJTF on a rotational basis, but answerable to the civilian Head-of-Mission at the LCBC secretariat in N’Djamena in Chad Republic. The Executive Secretary/Head-Of-Mission is in turn, only, accountable to the Heads-of-State and leaders of the four nation-states of the LCBDC. This structure, we argue,  ensures a fluidity and nimbleness in decision-making process in meeting the developmental needs (civilian responsibilities) of the populace and simultaneously seamlessly coordinates law and order in the affected communities of the Lake Chad Basin areas. 

This conforms to the essential theoretical underpinnings of Polycentrism governance (albeit at a multinational and cross-regional level) - a fundamental democratic governance architecture as advocated by   (Araral and Hartley, 2013).The underlying conception and foundational principle being that “…modern societies embody institutional diversity reflected in multi‐level, multi-purpose, multi-sectoral, and multi-functional units of governance.” 

This can be linked to the management of environmental externalities as much as the organisation, LCBC, can adapt to the vagaries of the modern developmental challenges bedeviling the LCBDA region. Climate externalities as a result of climate change have been negatively impacting nation-states’ body-polity, socio-economic life and security for a number of years within this region. According to Ossei Baffour Frimpong of the Wilson-Africa Center, in spite of there not been an obvious ‘mono-causal’ link of externalities as a result of climate change effectively leading to the Boko Haram Terrorism (BHT; The Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad-JAS)) insurgency, the impact in the forms of environmental degradation brought on by climate change cannot be overlooked. (Frimpong  O.B., 2020)^{28 a,b,c,d.}

What governments have been unable to do in the security-challenged LCBDC region is to effectively roll-back the encroachment of the Sahara desert on the region and effectively restore the waters of the Lake Chad Basin (LCB). This is largely due to the displacements and dislocations within the area due to the conflict brought on by the BHT and its splinter groups - the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP - Wilāyat Garb Ifrīqīyā).The lake Chad Basin (LCB) is a source of support for the way of life of   over 30 million West and Central Africans.²⁹ As a consequence the absence of peace is further exacerbated by the depletion of LCB, a lifeblood of the political economy of the area. Negatively affecting their abilities to conduct artisanal fishing and farming in the various affected communities.^c Attendant corresponding impact are the following externalities: widespread poverty leading to a rural-urban drift/migration; drought and denuded soil cover; water scarcity; disappearing fisheries cottage industries; unseasonal rainfall impacting planting and harvest patterns, food insecurity, a dearth of livestock economy.^d

Conclusion

The present review suggests several recommendations and suggestions for further policy work. 

1. Regional collaboration is going to be more important than ever with climate change, water resources being a prominent but not the only area where such collaboration will be necessary. 
2. Such collaborations must include continual communication, not presuming that once an agreement is reached one can remove attention and move on to other issues. 
3. As a corollary to continual communication, agreements must be continually revisited. Not only may internal socio-political factors change with time, but some studies show that climate changes will accelerate. If so, the 10 years to build a dam or another large infrastructure projects may be in response to circumstances that are no longer relevant. 
4. One must consider he qualities of a person must have to lead and manage such situations. That person must have or gain the support of people to know that the leader has their best interest in mind but may need to compromise. To accomplish this the leader must be transparent in communications yet also filter communications to preserve cooperation with other nations.  Research on the qualities of leaders who may best handle such situations will be valuable to leadership training and the actual implementation of regional collaboration for resource management.

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1. An Analyses of an Absence of Governance & Multilateral Cooperation in Combating Environmental Degradation

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